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In 1927, Charles Spearman suggested that general cognitive ability, or g, might be stronger at the low
end of ability. We explored the manifold of g across the ability distribution in a large sample (range
>800 to >4000 individuals) of British twins assessed longitudinally at 7, 9 and 10 years old using two verbal
and two nonverbal tests at each age, thus testing eﬀects of age on the saturation of g. We rankit-normalized
the test scores, then used a median split on the test with the highest factor-loading. We derived the ﬁrst
principal component from the remaining three tests. We performed each analysis for the whole sample
(within age) and also separately by sex. The ﬁrst principal component explains more variance in g in the
low ability group at every age and in both sexes separately but the F ratio eigenvalues show that, except
at age 7 and principally in females, the diﬀerence between the low and high ability groups is not signiﬁcant.
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The positive manifold of correlations among scores on diverse cognitive tests was discov-
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the reliability of height and weight measured in a doctor’s oﬃce (Jensen, 1998, p50), its predictive
power leaves rival psychometric constructs in the dust yet, despite a century of research, certain
properties of g are still unresolved.
One unsettled property pertains to the uniformity, or otherwise, of the strength of g across the
distribution. Presenting some data collected by Abelson on ‘normal’ and ‘defective’ children,
Spearman proposed that the g saturation might be stronger at the low end of the ability distribu-
tion, stating ‘‘the more ‘energy’ a person has available already, the less advantage accrues to his
ability from further increments of it.’’ (Spearman, 1927). Spearman does not oﬀer readers any-
thing in the way of an explanation for this idea. Instead, he oﬀers argument by analogy with a
technology of the day: steam engines. Doubling the amount of coal shoveled does not double
the speed of the engine. Spearman is tentative about his own metaphor: ‘‘possibly there exists fur-
ther a genuine law of diminishing returns for mental as for material processes’’ (Spearman, 1927).
Here Spearman refers to the economic principle that captures the fact that increasing inputs does
not guarantee increased output in the same proportion. On the basis of this halting suggestion,
much of the research into the nature of g throughout the ability distribution now falls under
the banner of ‘Spearman’s Law of Diminishing Returns’ (SLODR). Spearman, who had a fond-
ness for Laws (he indexed 31 of them in one of his books, (Spearman, 1937), but did not name this
one, might have been surprised.
The published literature exploring the gradient of g along the ability distribution is large; a very
comprehensive review of a century of work on this topic lists over a hundred studies (Hartmann &
Nyborg, 2006). This large body of work can be divided into two kinds with some overlap between
them: those that analyse the gradient in g over the ability distribution of similar aged-people, and
those that analyse the ability distribution over time. We will discuss the former, ability within age-
group, research ﬁrst.
Two reviews of the ability gradient, published within the last decade, found evidence in support
of Spearman’s conjecture (Deary et al., 1996; Jensen, 1998). A key study that included high-school
age children found substantial diﬀerentiation in the strength of the g manifold: the latent factor
that emerged from scores on a battery of mental tests, and a separate measure of full–scale IQ
(WAIS-R) was up to twice as large in the low ability group as they were in the high ability group
(Detterman & Daniel, 1989). There is also evidence that the association between reaction time and
intelligence (as measured by Alice Heim 4 score) is stronger among low ability subjects (Der &
Deary, 2003).
The Detterman and Daniel study stimulated renewed interest in the topic of SLODR. The basic
result, that the gmanifold is greater among those of low ability, received at least partial support in
several subsequent studies involving subjects of various ages (Abad, Colom, Juan-Espinosa, &
Garcia, 2003; Deary et al., 1996). Two studies that found some support for SLODR also reported
that the g-loading of the tests in the battery inﬂuenced the outcome: the low–high ability group
diﬀerence in g manifold shrinks among highly g-loaded tests relative to less g-loaded subtests
(Deary et al., 1996; Jensen, 2003).
Some studies have ‘found against’ SLODR (Fogarty & Stankov, 1995). One study sampled two
large populations of Danish military draftees (n > 25,000 in each sample) (Hartmann & Teasdale,
2004). Another study that found no convincing evidence favouring SLODR explored data on chil-
dren aged 4–9 (n = 574) in a French national standardization sample (Facon, 2004). An exhaus-
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evidence supported the contention that the g factor accounts for more variance among those in
lower ability groups (Hartmann & Nyborg, 2006).
Spearman wondered whether advancing age might decrease the manifold; although it is unclear
why he made this suggestion, since he refers only to work by Cyril Burt showing that teachers’
ratings of students correlated more highly with reasoning test scores in younger children than they
did with older children (Spearman, 1927).
Published studies examining the factor structure of intelligence across ages (rather than between
ability groups) include subject populations ranging from babies to older adults (89+ years) (Hofs-
taetter, 1954; Li et al., 2004). Such wide age diﬀerences make the studies harder to compare with
one another. Four longitudinal studies have been published, but only one study (involving gifted
compared with non gifted children (Coyle, 2003), controlled for ability while assessing the size of
the manifold (Atkin et al., 1977; Olsson & Bergman, 1977; Osborne & Suddick, 1972; Swineford,
1947). Without this, the studies on SLODR over the life-course become harder to interpret. An
exhaustive meta-analytic study of SLODR and its interaction with age, found no support for
the hypothesis that the g manifold attenuates with age, if ability is controlled (Hartmann & Ny-
borg, 2006).
Thus the phenomenon – the strength of the g manifold throughout the ability distribution – is
unresolved. As well as inconsistencies in reports on the phenomenon, a satisfactory explanation
remains elusive. We acknowledge the diﬃculties in developing convincing explanations for things
that do not exist, but it would be satisfying to ﬁnd out, if the size of the gmanifold is inﬂuenced by
ability, why that is so. A further, natural question to ask, in the light of the well-known heritabil-
ity of this trait, is whether or not any discovered diﬀerentiation is under genetic inﬂuence.
Education has been invoked as an environmental explanation for the SLODR eﬀect (Abad
et al., 2003).
In the current study we test the SLODR hypothesis that phenotypic g is greater at the lower end
of ability in a longitudinal design, examining each sex separately. This is the only study we know
of that tests the gradient in g within a cohort that is divided into two ability groups, through early
and middle childhood. We have no strong hypothesis about age changes or sex diﬀerences.2. Methods
2.1. Participants
The Twins Early Development Study (TEDS) recruited families following the birth of twins
born in England and Wales in 1994, 1995 and 1996 (Trouton, Spinath, & Plomin, 2002). Nearly
16,000 families were contacted, of whom just over 11,000 agreed to participate. Although there
has been some attrition, the population remains fairly representative of the British population
as a whole. Only a sub-sample of the 1994 cohort has so far participated at 10 years, so the num-
ber of subjects included in this analysis at age 10 is smaller than it is at other ages.
In this study we excluded from analysis all children whose mothers had experienced severe
problems in pregnancy and children who had suﬀered severe medical problems or whose birth
weight was less than .47 kg. Other exclusions were: data from children with unknown sex or
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example); and data returned more than 6 months after a relevant birthday. We also excluded chil-
dren whose scores on tests (described below) fell more than 3 standard deviations (SDs) below the
mean or were more than 3 SDs above the mean, in order to avoid distortion of the results by out-
liers. We then split the population at each age (n = 9632 at age 7, n = 6169 at age 9, n = 1645 at
age 10) into two samples. Individuals within a twin pair were randomly assigned to sample A or B.
The two samples are related (sharing half or all their genes) so we do not present them as inde-
pendent replication samples, but we considered that it would be interesting to see whether similar
patterns emerged in both samples.
2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Children at age 7
The children were administered four tests of cognitive ability by telephone at age 7; for details
see (Harlaar, Spinath, Dale, & Plomin, 2004; Petrill, Rempell, Oliver, & Plomin, 2002). At age 7
the verbal tests consisted of the Similarities test (in what way are milk and water alike?) and the
Vocabulary test (what does ‘strenuous’ mean?) of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children
(WISC-III-UK; Wechsler, 1992). The non-verbal tests were the Picture Completion test from
the WISC-III-UK and Conceptual Grouping from the McCarthy Scales of Children’s Abilities
(McCarthy, 1972). Cronbach’s alpha is >.8 on these tests with the exception of Conceptual
Grouping (alpha = .66).
2.2.2. Children at age 9
Nine-year old participants took four mental tests administered under parental supervision
using booklets that were mailed to the parents (for details see (Arden & Plomin, 2006). Tests in-
cluded a puzzle test adapted from the Figure Classiﬁcation test of the Cognitive Abilities Test 3
(Smith, Fernandes, & Strand, 2001), a shapes test also adapted from the CAT3 Figure Analogies
test that assesses inductive and deductive reasoning, a general knowledge test adapted from the
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, Information Multiple Choice (Kaplan, Fein, Kramer,
Delis, & Morris, 1999) and a vocabulary test also adapted from the Wechsler Intelligence Scale
for Children.
2.2.3. Children at age 10
Four tests were administered online via the internet to 10-year old participants: two verbal rea-
soning tests derived fromWISC-III-PI Information Multiple-Choice and the WISC-III-PI Vocab-
ulary Multiple-Choice. Two non-verbal tests were also administered; these were adapted from the
WISC-III–UK Picture Completion and from Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (Kaplan
et al., 1999; Raven, Court, & Raven, 1996; Wechsler, 1992).
2.3. Data preparation
At each age, we inspected the shape of the distribution of each of the cognitive ability tests.
Deviations from normality in skewness and kurtosis were evident in more than half the 12 tests
(4 tests at each of 3 ages). We experimented with various cut-oﬀ points to slice the distribution
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served data contributed to distortions. We then rankit-normalized the scores. This transformation
preserves ordinality but alters the intervals to produce a normal distribution: rankit uses the for-
mula (r  1/2)/w, where w is the number of observations and r is the rank (Bliss, Greenwood, &
White, 1956). Since psychometric data are neither ratio-scale nor true interval-scale data, we took
the view that the beneﬁt of the method outweighs possible distortions. The usefulness of this
method is predicated on the assumption that the true scores are normally distributed despite
the observed scores displaying some skewness. The evidence seems to favor normality (in true
scores) so we retained the rankit-normalized scores. The correlations between the rankit-normal-
ized test scores and the original standardized scores were over .94 (range .97–.98 at age 7, .94–.99
at age 9 and .97–.99 at age 10), indicating that the rankit transformation does not radically alter
the basic data.
2.4. Selecting the subgroups
Each of the four tests at each age loaded highly on the ﬁrst principal component (PC1: .55–.81
at age 7, .68–.77 at age 9 and .71–.76 at age 10). We divided our samples at the mean into low and
high ability groups using the most g-loaded test as the selection criterion. We did not use the total
g-factor score to divide the samples because that would have introduced artefactual negative cor-
relations between the tests (see Jensen, 2003, p. 27 for elucidation of this point). Since any test has
features that are general as well as features that are test-speciﬁc, we reasoned that using the test
with the most general component as a selection criterion would yield the most informative results.
Scores from the selection criterion test were excluded from the subsequent analysis, so each anal-
ysis reports the PC1 derived from the 3 other tests. The most g-loaded tests were the vocabulary
test at age 7, the puzzle test at age 9 and the vocabulary test at age 10.
2.5. Analyses
We derived the PC1 (the g manifold) from the 3 tests separately for the low ability group and
the high ability group and report the variance explained by PC1. We decided that since our anal-
yses depend on only 3 tests, our method would not be improved by following Kaiser’s rule (Kai-
ser, 1968) to calculate average r. We report the PC1 as a function of ability, age and sex to allow
comparisons within and between the two sexes and across the developmental period in our study.3. Results
3.1. Low versus high ability groups
The low groups consistently show a greater manifold (more variance explained by PC1) than do
the high groups (Table 1 and Figs. 1–3) at every age in both samples. The only age at which the
low/high diﬀerences are signiﬁcant is age 7 and here the diﬀerence is carried by the females
(F = 1.12, p = .03) as shown in Table 4 below. The two samples (each sample comprising one ran-
domly selected member of each twin pair) show considerable consistency.
Table 1
Both sexes: percentage of variance explained by PC1
Age Ability group Sample A: PC1 Sample B: PC1
7 Low 45.85 45.72
7 High 42.26 41.04
9 Low 53.30 52.42
9 High 50.16 52.04
10 Low 54.52 53.15













































Fig. 2. % Variance explained by PC1, on the y-axis as a function of age and ability group, split by sex.
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There is a clear age trend: the size of the manifold increases with age. The PC1 extracted from















Fig. 3. % Variance explained by PC1, on the y-axis, as a function of age and sex.
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manifold among the boys increased with age. The girls’ pattern is less consistent though the same
general trend is visible.
3.3. Within-sex comparisons
We found no signiﬁcant diﬀerences. The g manifold of girls in the low ability group is generally
higher than the manifold of girls in the high ability group with the exception of girls at age 9 in
both samples. Among boys there are no exceptions: the manifold is greater in all low ability
groups than the high ability groups. The age eﬀects reported above are also visible when the sexes
are analyzed separately. There are some exceptions, but the trend is clear in both samples: the size
of the manifold increases with age within both low and high ability girls.
3.4. Sex diﬀerences
We found no signiﬁcant diﬀerences, although Tables 2 and 3 (see below) show a trend in which
the manifold is generally greater in boys than in girls. In both samples, girls at 9 show a greater
manifold than boys at 10. This eﬀect is carried by the sub-group of high ability children.Table 2
Males: percentage of variance explained by PCI
Age & Ability group Sample A: PC1 Sample B: PC1
7 Low 46.32 45.07
7 High 43.41 41.82
9 Low 55.24 52.02
9 High 50.23 51.89
10 Low 54.14 57.76
10 High 52.33 54.22
Table 3
Females: percentage of variance explained by PCI
Age & Ability group Sample A: PC1 Sample B: PC1
7 Low 45.61 45.97
7 High 40.87 40.21
9 Low 51.88 51.95
9 High 50.27 52.36
10 Low 55.91 49.43
10 High 48.86 48.83
Table 4
F Ratio of Low ability/High ability eigenvalues


















7 M 1.390 1.302 1.068 1.352 1.254 1.078
n = 1086 n = 1218 p = .132 n = 1098 n = 1200 p = .101
7 F 1.368 1.226 1.116* 1.379 1.206 1.143**
n = 1284 n = 1136 p = .029 n = 1249 n = 1190 p = .010
7 Both sexes 1.376 1.268 1.085* 1.371 1.231 1.114**
n = 2375 n = 2356 p = .024 n = 2353 n = 2394 p = .004
9 M 1.657 1.507 1.100 1.591 1.557 1.022
n = 696 n=756 p = .100 n = 698 n = 739 p = .385
9 F 1.556 1.508 1.032 1.558 1.571 0.992
n = 843 n = 820 p = .325 n = 839 n = 818 p = .546
9 Both sexes 1.599 1.505 1.062 1.572 1.561 1.007
n = 1539 n = 1576 p = .118 n = 1537 n = 1557 p = .445
10 M 1.624 1.570 1.034 1.733 1.627 1.065
n = 179 n = 167 p = .414 n = 168 n = 187 p = .337
10 F 1.677 1.466 1.144 1.483 1.465 1.012
n = 247 n = 229 p = .151 n = 237 n = 238 p = .463
10 Both sexes 1.636 1.518 1.078 1.595 1.529 1.043
n = 426 n = 396 p = .224 n = 405 n = 425 p = .334
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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Two clear results emerge from our study: ﬁrst, the diﬀerences we found between the low and
high ability groups were, with the exception of the 7 year olds, not signiﬁcant and second, the
low > high eﬀect in the absolute strength of the manifold was systematic despite the diﬀerences
in tests and administration, across age and across sex. These two results are not as contradictory
as they might seem. They might suggest that small diﬀerences, latent in middle childhood, will
emerge more strongly in adulthood as found in other studies. Another possibility is that the small
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stronger in boys. There is a trend towards the strength of the manifold increasing with age
although the eﬀect is somewhat equivocal in girls.
We found that the size of the manifold increased during the small developmental window that
we scrutinized; this is the opposite result predicted by Spearman and also goes against the non-
signiﬁcant but discernible trend we found for the g manifold to be greater for children of lower
ability. How do we reconcile these two apparently contradictory results?
The developmental increase in the size of the phenotypic g is what we see when we look, by
analogy, down a telescope at a series of populations lined up on an age gradient; older popula-
tions have a larger g manifold than the younger populations. Continuing the analogy, if we take
just one population and put it under a microscope after artiﬁcially segregating it into two groups.
We see some detail that is not evident in the larger picture. The ‘co-morbidity’ of this polygenic,
normally distributed, continuous trait is greater at one end of the distribution than it is at the
other end.
It has been suggested that the greater g manifold for low ability children is attributable to edu-
cation (Abad et al., 2003). Our results do not support that conjecture because we ﬁnd a diﬀerence
in the size of the manifold between low ability and high ability children who have received a clo-
sely similar amount of education, under the standardizing inﬂuence of a national curriculum. Our
sample is large enough for rather ﬁne diﬀerences to be detected and although we clearly see a trend
in which the low ability groups show a higher manifold, the diﬀerences between groups were not
signiﬁcant.
4.1. Limitations
We acknowledge some obvious limitations of our study. Our test battery consists of only four
tests. Our results could be speciﬁc to these tests, a possibility mentioned elsewhere (Jensen, 2003).
Our population is longitudinal: the tests and the test format diﬀer at each age (by telephone at 7,
parent supervised, mailed-booklets at 9 and web-based testing at 10). Perhaps the consistency of
the result (showing a marginally larger manifold in low versus high ability groups) across diﬀerent
tests and methods of test-administration should strengthen our conﬁdence in the SLODR eﬀect
reported by others in older populations.5. Conclusion
Does it matter whether or not the strength of the g manifold is uniform? We think it does. Our
study showed no evidence of signiﬁcant diﬀerences between low and high ability groups, but be-
cause we did ﬁnd a clear trend in the size of the PC1 we would value knowing whether the small
diﬀerences will become larger as the children in our samples mature into adulthood. If the nature
of g diﬀers for the top and bottom halves of the distribution, molecular genetic association re-
search might yield stronger associations in the lower half of the distribution where g is reported
by others to be stronger.
Since g is an important and useful predictor variable it is essential to develop increasingly accu-
rate insights about the strength of g along the ability distribution. We hope to have extended
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inquiring into development through our three-aged study.Acknowledgements
We sincerely thank the families in TEDS whose contributions are the foundation for this re-
search. We also thank Peter Hartmann and Helmuth Nyborg for sharing generously with us,
the extensive literature review from Peter Hartmann’s upcoming doctoral thesis. The writing of
this article, and our related research, were supported in part by grants from the Medical Research
Council (G0500079), the Wellcome Trust (GR75492), and the National Institutes of Health
(HD46167, HD44454, HD49861).References
Abad, F. J., Colom, R., Juan-Espinosa, M., & Garcia, L. F. (2003). Intelligence diﬀerentiation in adult samples.
Intelligence, 31(2), 157–166.
Arden, R., & Plomin, R. (2006). Sex diﬀerences in variance of intelligence across childhood. Personality and Individual
Diﬀerences, 41(1), 39–48.
Atkin, R., Bray, R., Davison, M., Herzberger, S., Humphreys, L., & Selzer, U. (1977). Ability factor diﬀerentiation,
grades 5 through 11. Applied Psychological Measurement, 1(1), 65–76.
Bliss, C. I., Greenwood, M. L., & White, E. S. (1956). A rankit analysis of paired comparisons for measuring the eﬀect
of sprays on ﬂavor. Biometrics, 12(4), 381–403.
Coyle, T. R. (2003). Iq, the worst performance rule, and spearman’s law: A reanalysis and extension. Intelligence, 31(5),
473–489.
Deary, I. J., Egan, V., Gibson, G. J., Austin, E. J., Brand, C. R., & Kellaghan, T. (1996). Intelligence and the
diﬀerentiation hypothesis. Intelligence, 23(2), 105–132.
Der, G., & Deary, I. J. (2003). Iq, reaction time and the diﬀerentiation hypothesis. Intelligence, 31(5), 491–503.
Detterman, D. K., & Daniel, M. H. (1989). Correlations of mental tests with each other and with cognitive variables are
highest for low iq groups. Intelligence, 13(4), 349–359.
Facon, B. (2004). Are correlations between cognitive abilities highest in low-iq groups during childhood? Intelligence,
32(4), 391–401.
Fogarty, G. J., & Stankov, L. (1995). Challenging the ‘‘law of diminishing returns’’. Intelligence, 21(2), 157–174.
Harlaar, N., Spinath, F. M., Dale, P. S., & Plomin, R. (2004). Genetic inﬂuences on early word recognition: A study of
7-year-old twins. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 45(0), 1–2.
Hartmann, P., & Nyborg, H. (2006). Spearman’s ’law of diminishing returns’. A critical eye on a century of methods,
results and current standing of the theory. Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, University of Aarhus, Aarhus.
Hartmann, P., & Teasdale, T. W. (2004). A test of spearman’s ‘‘law of diminishing returns’’ in two large samples of
danish military draftees. Intelligence, 32(5), 499–508.
Hofstaetter, P. R. (1954). The changing composition of intelligence – a study in t-technique. Journal Of Genetic
Psychology, 85(1), 159–164.
Jensen, A. R. (1998). The g factor: The science of mental ability. Wesport: Praeger.
Jensen, A. R. (2003). Regularities in spearman’s law of diminishing returns. Intelligence, 31(2), 95–105.
Kaiser, H. F. (1968). A measure of average intercorrelation. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 28(2), 245.
Kaplan, E., Fein, D., Kramer, J., Delis, D., & Morris, R. (1999). Wisc-iii as a process instrument (wisc-iii-pi). New
York: The Psychological Corporation.
Li, S. C., Lindenberger, U., Hommel, B., Aschersleben, G., Prinz, W., & Baltes, P. B. (2004). Transformations in the
couplings among intellectual abilities and constituent cognitive processes across the life span. Psychological Science,
15(3), 155–163.
R. Arden, R. Plomin / Personality and Individual Diﬀerences 42 (2007) 743–753 753McCarthy, D. (1972). Mccarthy scales of children’s abilities. New York: The Psychological Corporation.
Olsson, U., & Bergman, L. R. (1977). A longitudinal factor model for studying change in ability structure.Multivariate
Behavioral Research, 12(2), 221.
Osborne, R. T., & Suddick, D. E. (1972). A longitudinal investigation of the intellectual diﬀerentiation hypothesis.
Journal of Genetic Psychology, 121(1), 83.
Petrill, S. A., Rempell, J., Oliver, B., & Plomin, R. (2002). Testing cognitive abilities by telephone in a sample of 6-to 8-
year olds. Intelligence, 30(4), 353–360.
Raven, J. C., Court, J. H., & Raven, J. (1996). Manual for raven’s progressive matrices and vocabulary scales. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Smith, P., Fernandes, C., & Strand, R. (2001). Figure classiﬁcation and ﬁgure analogies. In Cognitive abilities test 3
(cat3). Windsor: nferNELSON.
Spearman, C. (1927). The abilities of man: Their nature and measurement. New York: Macmillan.
Spearman, C. E. (1904). ’general intelligence’ objectively determined and measured. American Journal of Psychology, 5,
201–293.
Spearman, C. E. (1937) (1st ed.). Psychology down the ages (Vol. 2). London: Macmillan and Company Limited.
Swineford, F. (1947). Growth in the general and verbal bi-factors from grade vii to grade ix. Journal of Educational
Psychology, 38, 257.
Trouton, A., Spinath, F. M., & Plomin, R. (2002). Twins early development study (teds): A multivariate, longitudinal
genetic investigation of language, cognition and behavior problems in childhood. Twin Res, 5(5), 444–448.
Wechsler, D. (1992). Wechsler intelligence scale for children – third edition uk (wisc-iii uk) manual. London: The
Psychological Corporation.
